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Approved For Release 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400030010-5

18 July 1950

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, IAC Ad Hoc Committee to develop  
a recommended U. S. policy toward Soviet  
and Satellite service attache personnel**

1. Enclosed as Tab "A" is a "Draft of Policy Towards Soviet Orbit Representatives in the U.S.", prepared by the Air Force member of the Ad Hoc Committee.
2. In accordance with the understanding reached at the last meeting, it is requested that you study the enclosure with a view toward finalizing committee action on subject draft at the next committee meeting.
3. The next meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee will be held in the Conference Room of the Director of Central Intelligence in the Administration Building, 2430 K Street, N. W., at 2:00 P. M. on Thursday, 27 July 1950.

**Colonel, USAF**  
**CIA Chairman**

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**Colonel D. W. Whelan, Room 4B-502, The Pentagon (loss enclosure)**  
**Colonel A. J. D. Middle, Room 2B-544, The Pentagon**  
**Commander W. R. Wilson, Room 5C-620, The Pentagon**  
**Colonel E. Vance, Room 2B-961, The Pentagon**  
**Mr. George Fearing, Room 300, State Annex 1**  
**Mr. S. W. Reynolds, Room 7645, U. S. Department of Justice**

USAF review(s) completed.

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TAB "A"

*Heck*  
17 July 1950

DRAFT OF POLICY TOWARDS SOVIET ORBIT  
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE U.S.

1. The lack of a coordinated U.S. policy dealing with the treatment of Soviet orbit official representatives not only has produced confusion and endangered security, but also may have been interpreted by the Soviets as evidence of U.S. weakness. The current degree of conflict existing between the U.S. and the USSR makes increasingly important the adoption of a consistent policy.

2. Development of a sound U.S. policy to correct this deficiency, while striving toward a reciprocal balance, must remain within the realm of practicability, particularly with regard to U.S. capabilities to enforce the policy adopted. Within this frame of reference, U.S. policy should (be designed to communicate to the Kremlin what we want it to know.)

3. Policy implementation at this time is believed to be served best by a gradual increase of restrictive procedures as opposed to a sudden shift from extreme laxity to extreme severity. This approach has the advantage of offering a better opportunity for bargaining with the Soviet Government as regards restrictive treatment of U.S. officials on duty within the Soviet orbit. The U.S. will be in a position to apply a relatively greater range of restrictions if necessary, whereas existing Soviet restrictions affecting U.S. personnel are now of such proportions as to allow but little additional leeway.

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4. In recommending initial U.S. policy, cognizance has been taken of existing restrictive policies in force in the USSR and satellites states, and of the implications involved in adopting the envisaged procedures. The following recommendations shall be reviewed quarterly, or oftener if such action appears desirable, and revised in accordance with the spirit of this policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

General.

5. That U.S. policy shall be directed primarily toward delay--involving Soviet orbit representatives in bureaucratic red tape--rather than denial of right to travel, although in specific instances, denial also may be desirable.

6. That travel restrictions applied by U.S. will in no instance be more stringent than restrictive regulations in effect within each corresponding Soviet orbit state.

Specific

7. That ~~unrestricted~~ travel for Soviet and ~~Rumanian~~ official representatives on duty in Washington <sup>Soviet Consulate</sup> and ~~New York~~ <sup>or wherever stationed</sup> be limited to a radius of 35 miles.

8. That "official representatives" shall be interpreted to include all representatives of these countries on duty in the United States in an official capacity exclusive of United Nations representatives.

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9. That all such representatives whose movement is subject to restriction by interpretation of this policy will <sup>(be permitted to)</sup> accomplish travel outside of the restricted zone only after having <sup>notified</sup> obtained written authority from the U.S. agency of primary concern (example: Foreign Service Attaches - Dept of State; Army Attaches - Dept of Army, etc.). <sup>Notification of</sup> (Requests for) such travel shall be submitted by the Chief of mission <sup>three days</sup> (in 10 copies), at least (48 hours) in advance of the intended time of departure with a statement of the following:

- a. Names of persons included in party.
- b. Persons and places to be visited, including a complete <sup>new version</sup> itinerary.
- c. Purpose of trip.
- d. Mode of travel.
- e. Items of personal equipment to accompany party.
- f. Estimate of funds to be expended during trip.

10. That the FBI shall institute "spot check" procedures on personnel movements as <sup>and practicable</sup> (deemed) necessary, ~~in conjunction with the~~ implementation of this policy. <sup>add new sentence</sup>

11. That infractors who are thereby <sup>detected</sup> apprehended will be subject to immediate recall by official declaration -- "persona non grata."

12. That requests to visit specific U.S. installations of military, scientific, or strategic significance will be granted on a reciprocal basis, particularly where U.S. representatives have been

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denied similar privileges within the Soviet orbit, and only after a U.S. representative, or representatives, have completed a similar visit in a Soviet orbit country.

13. Movement of Personal Property. That in order to minimize more effectively sabotage, including possible atomic sabotage, and "fifth column" activities, all movements of personal property belonging to Soviet orbit representatives will be handled by an agency designated by the U.S. This is interpreted to include the movement of all goods being shipped by or to Soviet orbit embassies, missions, or individuals.

14. Social Functions' Representatives. That all matters concerning protocol in which U.S. and Soviet orbit representatives are involved will be monitored by informal liaison between the agencies concerned; in no instance, however, shall any U.S. <sup>military</sup> agency have higher ranking representatives in attendance at any Soviet orbit function than any other <sup>military</sup> agency, nor shall any U.S. <sup>military</sup> agency extend invitations to higher ranking Soviet orbit representatives than any other <sup>military</sup> agency would under similar circumstances.

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AUTH CS, USAF

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Headquarters United States Air Force  
Washington 25, D.C.

*idw*  
17 July 1950

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MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, IAC Ad Hoc Committee

SUBJECT: Draft of Policy Towards Soviet Orbit Representatives in the U.S.

1. Inclosed as Tab "A" is "Draft of Policy Towards Soviet Orbit Representatives in the U.S.", to be proposed for adoption by the IAC.

2. It is requested that a meeting of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee be convened at an early date at your convenience for the purpose of final action on subject draft.

*Donald N. Wackwitz*

DONALD N. WACKWITZ  
Colonel, USAF  
USAF Member of  
IAC Ad Hoc Committee

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26 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Ad Hoc Committee to perform initial study on U.S. policy toward Soviet and Satellite Service Attache Personnel in the U. S.

1. The third meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee was held at 2:00 P.M., 25 May 1950.

2. Members present were:

[redacted] - CIA, Chairman  
Mr. George R. Fearing - State  
Colonel A. D. Biddle - Army  
Colonel R. Vance - JIG  
Colonel D. N. Wackwitz - Air Force  
Commander W. R. Wilson - Navy

The following additional representatives were present:

Mr. Fred Reinhardt - State  
Lieut. Colonel N. S. deTolly - Air Force  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach - FBI, representing  
Mr. S. W. Reynolds who was out of town

3. Colonel Biddle presented a memorandum on the Army position regarding the problem of restrictions on Soviet and Satellite diplomatic personnel, and the committee chairman acknowledged receipt of the State Department airgram and replies thereto regarding the question of travel restrictions.

4. Mr. Reinhardt commented on the fact that the State Department from time to time had imposed certain travel restrictions upon representatives of specific countries showing the necessity for a flexible policy.

5. Colonel Biddle mentioned that the Services also had to make certain decisions upon specific occasions, in this regard. For instance he had just obtained a policy decision that he and one member from his office would represent the Department of the Army at a social function given by a member of the Soviet Embassy to which practically all senior Army officials had been invited.

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